Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64506
Authors: 
Henwood, Keith
Friedman, Daniel
Oprea, Ryan
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, UC Santa Cruz Economics Department 658
Abstract: 
Human players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the same game. These findings support a distinctive prediction of evolutionary game theory.
Subjects: 
evolutionary dynamics
Hawk-Dove game
game theory
laboratory experiment
continuous time game
JEL: 
C73
C92
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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