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dc.contributor.authorFriedman, Danielen_US
dc.contributor.authorHuck, Steffenen_US
dc.contributor.authorOprea, Ryanen_US
dc.contributor.authorWeidenholzer, Simonen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-28en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T12:41:32Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-28T12:41:32Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64505-
dc.description.abstractWe study long-run learning in an experimental Cournot game with no explicit information about the payoff function. Subjects see only the quantities and payoffs of each oligopolist after every period. In line with theoretical predictions and previous experimental findings, duopolies and triopolies both reach highly competitive levels, with price approaching marginal cost within 50 periods. Using the new ConG software, we extend the horizon to 1,200 periods, far beyond that previously investigated. Already after 100 periods we observe a qualitative change in behavior, and quantity choices start to drop. Without pausing at the Cournot-Nash level quantities continue to drop, eventually reaching almost fully collusive levels in duopolies and often reaching deep into collusive territory for triopolies. Fitted models of individual adjustment suggest that subjects switch from imitation of the most profitable rival to other behavior that, intentionally or otherwise, facilitates collusion via effective punishment and forgiveness. Remarkably, subjects never learn the best-reply correspondence of the one-shot game. Our results suggest a new explanation for the emergence of cooperation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. of California at Santa Cruz, Dep. of Economics Santa Cruz, Calif.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers, UC Santa Cruz Economics Department 701en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcournot oligopolyen_US
dc.subject.keywordimitationen_US
dc.subject.keywordlearning dynamicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcooperationen_US
dc.titleFrom imitation to collusion: Long-run learning in a low-information environmenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn722371071en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Economics Department, UC Santa Cruz

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