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dc.contributor.authorDevaro, Jeden_US
dc.contributor.authorKurtulus, Fidan Anaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-25T07:19:45Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-25T07:19:45Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64244-
dc.description.abstractWe address four empirical questions in this paper. Is there empirical support for: 1) the risk-incentives tradeoff predicted by agency theory? 2) a positive relationship between authority and incentives? 3) a positive relationship between risk and authority? 4) the main testable implication of Prendergast’s model, namely that the risk coefficient in an incentives regression should become smaller (i.e. less positive or more negative) when delegation of worker authority is incorporated into the riskincentives regression model? Our empirical results support affirmative answers to all four questions, though in some cases the relevant parameters are estimated with low precision. Thus, our analysis contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence clarifying the relationship between risk and incentive pay and how managers optimally bundle incentive pay and the delegation of worker decision rights to cope with risk. In particular, we attempt to reconcile the mixed nature of the empirical literature concerning evidence for a riskincentives tradeoff by empirically addressing Prendergast’s extension of the standard principal-agent model.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. of Massachusetts, Dep. of Economics Amherst, Mass.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper, University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics 2011-13en_US
dc.subject.jelD21en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.jelM51en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelM54en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordRisk versus Incentives Tradeoffen_US
dc.subject.keywordDelegation of Worker Authorityen_US
dc.subject.keywordPerformance Payen_US
dc.titleAn empirical analysis of risk, incentives and the delegation of worker authorityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn668009276en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts

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