Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/64242 
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dc.contributor.authorCoram, Alexen
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-25T07:19:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-25T07:19:42Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64242-
dc.description.abstractCompetition between political parties is a process that unfolds over time whereas formal theories of party competition have tended to take an essentially static, or one-shot, approach. This leaves some gaps in our understanding of the dynamics of campaigning. The aim of this paper is to make up some of this gap. This is done using a differential game theory model to analyse a situation in which support for a party depends on the amount spent on marketing relative to the expenditure of the other party. One of the main results is that, even when voters are not myopic, the logic of the competition forces parties to accelerate expenditure on campaigning during the period between elections.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Massachusetts, Department of Economics |cAmherst, MAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2008-01en
dc.subject.jelC61en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordparty competitionen
dc.subject.keyworddynamicsen
dc.subject.keyworddifferential gamesen
dc.titleThe dynamics of resource spending in a competition between political parties: General notes on the Red Queen effect-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn572985762en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:ums:papers:2008-01en

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