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dc.contributor.authorCoram, Alexen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-25T07:19:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-25T07:19:42Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64242-
dc.description.abstractCompetition between political parties is a process that unfolds over time whereas formal theories of party competition have tended to take an essentially static, or one-shot, approach. This leaves some gaps in our understanding of the dynamics of campaigning. The aim of this paper is to make up some of this gap. This is done using a differential game theory model to analyse a situation in which support for a party depends on the amount spent on marketing relative to the expenditure of the other party. One of the main results is that, even when voters are not myopic, the logic of the competition forces parties to accelerate expenditure on campaigning during the period between elections.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. of Massachusetts, Dep. of Economics Amherst, Mass.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper, University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics 2008-01en_US
dc.subject.jelC61en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordparty competitionen_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamicsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddifferential gamesen_US
dc.titleThe dynamics of resource spending in a competition between political parties: General notes on the Red Queen effecten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn572985762en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts

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