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dc.contributor.authorSchlütter, Sebastianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-21T12:33:35Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-21T12:33:35Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64130-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes how capital-related frictional costs (e.g., corporate or personal taxes) influence insurers' optimal pricing and safety level decisions. Frictional costs are modeled with an innovative generic approach that is compatible with many realistic forms of taxation. I show that in perfect competition, the insurer will always add the actual value of frictional costs to the premium; however, in imperfect competition, the insurer may overcharge or undercharge for frictional costs to achieve the shareholder-valuemaximizing combination of equity and premium income. Policymakers can enhance welfare by implementing appropriate tax and subsidy schemes that make insurance more affordable and also lower insurers' restraints to hold sufficient equity levels.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherInternational Center for Insurance Regulation, House of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Mainen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesICIR Working Paper Series 07/11en_US
dc.subject.jelG22en_US
dc.subject.jelG28en_US
dc.subject.jelH20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsprämieen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Preispolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikomanagementen_US
dc.subject.stwSteueren_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe role of frictional costs for insurance pricing and insurer default risken_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn719843863en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:icirwp:0711-
Appears in Collections:ICIR Working Paper Series, International Center for Insurance Regulation, Universität Frankfurt

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