EconStor >
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main >
International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR), Universität Frankfurt a. M. >
ICIR Working Paper Series, International Center for Insurance Regulation, Universität Frankfurt >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64127
  
Title:Safety versus affordability as targets of insurance regulation in an opaque market: A welfare approach PDF Logo
Authors:Stoyanova, Rayna
Schlütter, Sebastian
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:ICIR Working Paper Series 10/12
Abstract:Insurance regulation is typically aimed at policyholder protection. In particular, regulators attempt to ensure the financial safety of insurance firms, for example, by means of capital regulation, and to enhance the affordability of insurance, for example, by means of price ceilings. However, these goals are in conflict. Therefore, we identify situations in which regulators should be more concerned with safety or, alternatively, affordability. Our model incorporates default-risk-sensitive insurance demand, capital-related frictional costs, and imperfect risk transparency for policyholders.
Subjects:Insurance Regulation
Regulatory Targets
Welfare
Opaqueness
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:ICIR Working Paper Series, International Center for Insurance Regulation, Universität Frankfurt

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
719849888.pdf512.31 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64127

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.