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dc.contributor.authorSingh, Nirvikaren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-13en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-21T11:55:50Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-21T11:55:50Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64113-
dc.description.abstractThis paper surveys the state of fiscal federalism in India, in the broader context of decentralization. We begin with an overview of the basic features and recent developments in intergovernmental fiscal relations, including the role of political institutions, the specifics of legislative and budgetary autonomy, assignments of expenditure responsibility and revenue authority, revenue collection mechanisms, the system of intergovernmental transfers, and institutions and mechanisms for borrowing by subnational units. We then provide a diagnosis of accountability mechanisms, examining their quality of functioning and distortions and constraints. In particular, we analyze to what extent, and through what mechanisms, lower-level governments are held accountable to higher-level governments, the extent to which policies of subnational governments are affected by the competition for mobile firms, taxpayers, and investment capital, the functioning of credit markets, including the responsiveness of subnational governments to credit ratings and bond yields, and the role of democratic electoral channels at national and subnational levels in providing accountability in the provision of subnational public goods. Next, we review the implications of the intergovernmental system and accountability mechanisms on the cooperation of subnational governments and the quality of service delivery. We examine the resources and capacity of the subnational entities that areresponsible for key services such as water, sanitation, education and health care, and the impacts of decentralization on service quality and the distribution of benefits among elected officials, citizens and interest groups. Finally, we offer a concluding assessment with suggestions for reform priorities.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSanta Cruz Inst. for International Economics Santa Cruz, Calif.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers, Santa Cruz Center for International Economics 07-02en_US
dc.subject.jelP26en_US
dc.subject.jelP35en_US
dc.subject.jelH1en_US
dc.subject.jelH7en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfederalismen_US
dc.subject.keyworddecentralizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordintergovernmental relationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordeconomic reformen_US
dc.subject.keywordaccountabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordservice deliveryen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwDezentralisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftsreformen_US
dc.subject.stwIndienen_US
dc.titleFiscal federalism and decentralization in Indiaen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn604580096en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Santa Cruz Institute for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz

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