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Title:The political economy of a managed float: Special interests, monetary authorities, and regime choice PDF Logo
Authors:Lim, Jamus Jerome
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Working Papers, Santa Cruz Institute for International Economics 10-06
Abstract:With heterogeneous productivity and sticky prices in the short run, exchange rate changes can generate real effects on agents in the economy; the result is that the currency regime becomes a policy variable amenable to political competition. This paper discusses how special interests and government policymakers interact in the decisionmaking processes concerning the optimal level of the exchange rate, and how these interactions may lead to a disconnect between the exchange rate and economic fundamentals. Three extensions to the benchmark model consider the possibility of a semi-independent monetary authority, the existence of a legislature, and electoral pressures.
Subjects:exchange rate policy
special interest politics
new open-economy macroeconomics
JEL:D72
F33
F41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Santa Cruz Institute for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz

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