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ETLA Discussion Papers, Research Institute of the Finnish Economy >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63974
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| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Koskela, Erkki | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Ollikainen, Markku | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-09-21T11:29:28Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-09-21T11:29:28Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2002 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63974 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper analyzes the socially optimal forest taxation in the rotation framework when the government has a binding tax revenue requirement. In the Faustmann model the optimal design of taxation consists of non-distortionary taxes, such as site productivity tax, site value tax or profit tax. A combination of distortionary unit (or yield) tax and timber tax can also be used to collect the tax revenue in a nondistortionary way. In the Hartman model with forest amenity services as a public good, the optimal design consists of a non-distortionary tax and a Pigouvian tax, which adjusts the private rotation age to the socially optimal one. Now only the site productivity tax is non-distortionary, while unit, yield, timber, site value and profit taxes generally serve as corrective Pigouvian taxes. Finally, in the absence of a non-distortionary tax, if the marginal valuation of amenity services is non-decreasing with the age of forest stand, a combination of unit (or yield) and timber taxes can be used to both tax revenue collection and Pigouvian correction. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) Helsinki | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | ETLA Discussion Papers, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) 815 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q23 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | rotation age | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | forest amenities | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | optimal forest taxation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Forststeuer | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Optimale Besteuerung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Internalisierung externer Effekte | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Forstökonomie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wohlfahrtseffekt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Optimal forest taxation under private and social amenity valuation | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 353102970 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | ETLA Discussion Papers, Research Institute of the Finnish Economy
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