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Title:Distributional conflict, the state, and peacebuilding in Burundi PDF Logo
Authors:Ndikumana, Léonce
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:Research Paper, UNU-WIDER, United Nations University (UNU) 2005/45
Abstract:This paper examines the causes of conflict in Burundi and discusses strategies for building peace. The analysis of the complex relationships between distribution and group dynamics reveals that these relationships are reciprocal, implying that distribution and group dynamics are endogenous. The nature of endogenously generated group dynamics determines the type of preferences (altruistic or exclusionist), which in turn determines the type of allocative institutions and policies that prevail in the political and economic system. While unequal distribution of resources may be socially inefficient, it nonetheless can be rational from the perspective of the ruling elite, especially because inequality perpetuates dominance. However, as the unequal distribution of resources generates conflict, maintaining a system based on inequality is difficult because it requires ever increasing investments in repression. It is therefore clear that if the new Burundian leadership is serious about building peace, it must engineer institutions that uproot the legacy of discrimination and promote equal opportunity for social mobility for all members of ethnic groups and regions. – Burundi ; conflict ; inequality ; education
JEL:O15
O55
D74
ISBN:9291907286
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:WIDER Research Papers, United Nations University (UNU)

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