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WIDER Research Papers, United Nations University (UNU) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63370
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Chu, Ke-young | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-09-21T09:31:14Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-09-21T09:31:14Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2004 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.isbn | | 929190662X | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63370 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Findings of cross-cultural psychology suggest that different approaches to rule enforcement have cultural roots. Individualist societies have established a rule of law, in which rules prevail; collectivist societies have a rule of man, which allows discretionary rule enforcement, which, in turn, is recognized as an obstacle to sustained increases in productive long-term investment in developing countries. This paper presents a model that offers a unified framework to explain rule enforcement as social optimization processes in both individualist and collectivist societies and, on this basis, highlights the essential differences between a rule of law and a rule man (i.e., between rules and discretion). The paper uses this framework to show that cross-country variations in rule enforcement are explained to a considerable extent by cultural values. The paper then uses the framework to show how the imported multi-stage rule enforcement institutions based on separation of powers in vertically-oriented collectivist societies, unlike in the individualist societies from which they originate, might not ensure as low a degree of discretion as intended. Finally, the paper uses these results to explore practical ideas that would help collectivist societies benefit from rule enforcement with low discretion. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | UNU-WIDER Helsinki | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Research Paper, UNU-WIDER, United Nations University (UNU) 2004/65 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | K00 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | O17 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | rule of law | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | rule of man | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | collectivism | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | discretion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | enforcement | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | individualism | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | institutions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | rules | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Rechtsökonomik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Entwicklung | | en_US |
| dc.title | | A model of a rule of law and a rule of man: Implications for the design of institutions | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 477336655 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | WIDER Research Papers, United Nations University (UNU)
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