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dc.contributor.authorChu, Ke-youngen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-21T09:31:14Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-21T09:31:14Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.isbn929190662Xen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/63370-
dc.description.abstractFindings of cross-cultural psychology suggest that different approaches to rule enforcement have cultural roots. Individualist societies have established a rule of law, in which rules prevail; collectivist societies have a rule of man, which allows discretionary rule enforcement, which, in turn, is recognized as an obstacle to sustained increases in productive long-term investment in developing countries. This paper presents a model that offers a unified framework to explain rule enforcement as social optimization processes in both individualist and collectivist societies and, on this basis, highlights the essential differences between a rule of law and a rule man (i.e., between rules and discretion). The paper uses this framework to show that cross-country variations in rule enforcement are explained to a considerable extent by cultural values. The paper then uses the framework to show how the imported multi-stage rule enforcement institutions based on separation of powers in vertically-oriented collectivist societies, unlike in the individualist societies from which they originate, might not ensure as low a degree of discretion as intended. Finally, the paper uses these results to explore practical ideas that would help collectivist societies benefit from rule enforcement with low discretion.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUNU-WIDER Helsinkien_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesResearch Paper, UNU-WIDER, United Nations University (UNU) 2004/65en_US
dc.subject.jelK00en_US
dc.subject.jelO17en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordrule of lawen_US
dc.subject.keywordrule of manen_US
dc.subject.keywordcollectivismen_US
dc.subject.keyworddiscretionen_US
dc.subject.keywordenforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordindividualismen_US
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordrulesen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungen_US
dc.titleA model of a rule of law and a rule of man: Implications for the design of institutionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477336655en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:WIDER Research Papers, United Nations University (UNU)

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