Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/63335 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
WIDER Research Paper No. 2005/34
Publisher: 
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
Abstract: 
This paper presents a simple model to show how distributional concerns can engender social conflict. We have a two period model, where the cost of conflict is endogenous in the sense that parties involved have full control over how much conflict they can create. We find that anticipated future inequality plays a crucial role in determining the level of conflict in the current period. The model also provides an explanation for why similar levels of inequality may exhibit drastically different levels of conflict. Further, we argue that the link between inequality and conflict may be non-monotonic. – conflict ; wealth inequality ; Nash bargaining
JEL: 
C78
D31
D74
D90
ISBN: 
9291907154
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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