EconStor >
United Nations University (UNU) >
World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), United Nations University >
WIDER Research Papers, United Nations University (UNU) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63275
  
Title:Decentralizing aid with interested parties PDF Logo
Authors:Epstein, Gil S.
Gang, Ira N.
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:Research Paper, UNU-WIDER, United Nations University (UNU) 2006/06
Abstract:This paper analyses the decentralization of decisionmaking in aid-giving in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. In this analysis the root donor establishes a necessary criterion for potential recipients: good governance. The potential recipients compete in hierarchal contests for funds. The paper investigates whether, under certain reasonable conditions, fashionable aid procedures will lead to the development of a poverty trap.
Subjects:foreign aid
governance
decentralization
rent seeking
JEL:O10
O19
F35
O11
C23
O47
E21
E22
ISBN:9291907723
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:WIDER Research Papers, United Nations University (UNU)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
50914568X.pdf214.77 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63275

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.