EconStor >
University of Oslo >
Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63199
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMehlum, Halvoren_US
dc.contributor.authorMoene, Karl Oveen_US
dc.contributor.authorTorvik, Ragnaren_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T13:17:47Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T13:17:47Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/63199-
dc.description.abstractWhen the state fails to supply basic security and protection of property, violent entrepreneurs not only seize the opportunity of plundering, but some also enter the protection business and provide protection against plunderers. This uncoordinated division of labor is advantageous for the entire group of violent entrepreneurs. Hence, in weak states a situation may arise where a large number of violent entrepreneurs can operate side by side as plunderers and protectors squeezing the producers from both sides. The problem reached new levels at the end of the cold war. As military forces were demobilized without civilian jobs to go to, many countries got an oversupply of qualiÞed violent people for crime, warfare and private protection. In this .market for extortion. the entry of new violent entrepreneurs enhances the proÞtability of them all. The supply of violence creates its own demand; an externality of violence that is detrimental to the development in poor countries.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo Osloen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMemorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2002,10en_US
dc.subject.jelA10en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordentrepreneursen_US
dc.subject.keywordplunderingen_US
dc.subject.keywordextortionen_US
dc.subject.keywordviolenceen_US
dc.subject.stwOrganisierte Kriminalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwPolitisches Systemen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePlunder & Protection Inc.en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn350267332en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
350267332.pdf305.06 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.