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dc.contributor.authorNyborg, Karineen_US
dc.contributor.authorTelle, Kjetilen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T13:17:24Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T13:17:24Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/63179-
dc.description.abstractIt has often been claimed that firms’ compliance to environmental regulations is higher than predicted by standard theory, a result labeled the “Harrington paradox” in the literature. Enforcement data from Norway presented here appears, at first glance, to confirm this “stylized fact”: Firms are inspected less than once a year, detected violators are seldom fined, but still, serious violations seem relatively rare. However, at a closer look, the paradox dissolves: Enforcement of minor violations is lax, but such violations do flourish; serious violations are more uncommon, but such violations are subject to credible threats of harsh punishment. This seems quite consistent with predictions from standard theory. Although our finding may of course apply to Norway only, we argue that the empirical existence of the Harrington paradox is not well documented in the literature. Hence, the claim that firms’ compliance with environmental regulations is higher than predicted by standard theory should be viewed with skepticism.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo Osloen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMemorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2004,02en_US
dc.subject.jelK32en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.jelQ28en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEnvironmental performanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordcomplianceen_US
dc.subject.keywordenforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordHarrington paradoxen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltmanagementen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltrechten_US
dc.subject.stwNorwegenen_US
dc.titleA dissolving paradox: Firms' compliance to environmental regulationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn378236083en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo

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