|
EconStor >
University of Oslo >
Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63154
|
| | |
| Title: | | On the epistemic foundation for backward induction  |
| Authors: | | Asheim, Geir B. |
| Issue Date: | | 1999 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 1999,30 |
| Abstract: | | I characterize backward induction in an epistemic model of perfect information games where players have common certain belief of the consistency of preferences rather than the rationality of choice. In this approach, backward induction corresponds to common certain belief of ‘belief in each subgame of opponent rationality’. At an interpretative level this result resembles the one established by Aumann [6]. By instead imposing common certain belief of ‘belief (only in the whole game) of opponent rationality’, I interpret Ben Porath’s [14] support of the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure. |
| JEL: | | C72 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63154
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|