Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63150
Authors: 
Asheim, Geir B.
Claussen, Carl Andreas
Nilssen, Tore
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2005,02
Abstract: 
We consider a situation where society decides, through majority voting in a secret ballot, between the alternatives of ‘reform’ and ‘status quo’. Reform is assumed to create a minority of winners, while being efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense. We explore the consequences of allowing binding transfers between voters conditional on the chosen alternative. In particular, we establish conditions under which the winners wish to compensate all losers, thus leading to unanimity for reform, rather than compensating some losers to form a non-maximal majority. The analysis employs concepts from cooperative game theory.
Subjects: 
voting
reform
status quo
Kaldor-Hicks sense
chosen alternative
unanimity for reform
cooperative game theory
JEL: 
C71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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