Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/63147 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorNyborg, Karineen
dc.contributor.authorTelle, Kjetilen
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T13:15:49Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T13:15:49Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/63147-
dc.description.abstractRegulatory agencies frequently present violators with warnings, not pursuing prosecution if the violation ceases upon receipt of the warning. We show how such warnings may help regulators to keep control: Prosecution is costly for the regulator, and insu.cient prosecution e.orts yield low penalties. Thus, with a limited regulatory budget, threats of harsh sanctions are credible only if the number of violators is low. This produces multiple Nash equilibria. If firms may make mistakes, the economy can accidentally switch from one equilibrium to another. Warnings reduce substantially the probability of such accidental switches from the high to the low compliance equilibrium.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Oslo, Department of Economics |cOsloen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMemorandum |x2003,24en
dc.subject.jelD62en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.jelQ28en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEnforcementen
dc.subject.keywordwarningsen
dc.subject.keywordmultiple equilibriaen
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwNormbefolgungen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen
dc.titleThe role of warnings in regulation: Keeping control with less punishment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn369096908en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
453.33 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.