Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63147
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dc.contributor.authorNyborg, Karineen_US
dc.contributor.authorTelle, Kjetilen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T13:15:49Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T13:15:49Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/63147-
dc.description.abstractRegulatory agencies frequently present violators with warnings, not pursuing prosecution if the violation ceases upon receipt of the warning. We show how such warnings may help regulators to keep control: Prosecution is costly for the regulator, and insu.cient prosecution e.orts yield low penalties. Thus, with a limited regulatory budget, threats of harsh sanctions are credible only if the number of violators is low. This produces multiple Nash equilibria. If firms may make mistakes, the economy can accidentally switch from one equilibrium to another. Warnings reduce substantially the probability of such accidental switches from the high to the low compliance equilibrium.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo |cOsloen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMemorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo |x2003,24en_US
dc.subject.jelD62en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.jelQ28en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEnforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordwarningsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmultiple equilibriaen_US
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwNormbefolgungen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen_US
dc.titleThe role of warnings in regulation: Keeping control with less punishmenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn369096908en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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