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dc.contributor.authorBrekke, Kjell Arneen_US
dc.contributor.authorNyborg, Karineen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T13:14:39Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T13:14:39Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/63093-
dc.description.abstractMorally motivated individuals behave more cooperatively than predicted by standard theory. Hence,if a firm can attract workers who are strongly motivated by ethical concerns, moral hazard problems like shirking can be reduced. We show that employers may be able to use the firm’s corporate social responsibility profile as a screening device to attract more productive workers. Both pooling and separating equilibria are possible. Even when a substantial share of the workers have no moral motivation whatsoever, such screening may in fact drive every firm with a low social responsibility profile out of business.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo Osloen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMemorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2004,25en_US
dc.subject.jelD21en_US
dc.subject.jelD62en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.jelJ31en_US
dc.subject.jelQ50en_US
dc.subject.jelZ13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSelf-imageen_US
dc.subject.keywordteamworken_US
dc.subject.keywordshirkingen_US
dc.subject.keywordvoluntary abatementen_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensethiken_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Social Responsibilityen_US
dc.subject.stwPersonalauswahlen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsethiken_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVerantwortungen_US
dc.titleMoral hazard and moral motivation: Corporate social responsibility as labor market screeningen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn478454759en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo

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