EconStor >
University of Oslo >
Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63093
  
Title:Moral hazard and moral motivation: Corporate social responsibility as labor market screening PDF Logo
Authors:Brekke, Kjell Arne
Nyborg, Karine
Issue Date:2004
Series/Report no.:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2004,25
Abstract:Morally motivated individuals behave more cooperatively than predicted by standard theory. Hence,if a firm can attract workers who are strongly motivated by ethical concerns, moral hazard problems like shirking can be reduced. We show that employers may be able to use the firm’s corporate social responsibility profile as a screening device to attract more productive workers. Both pooling and separating equilibria are possible. Even when a substantial share of the workers have no moral motivation whatsoever, such screening may in fact drive every firm with a low social responsibility profile out of business.
Subjects:Self-image
teamwork
shirking
voluntary abatement
JEL:D21
D62
D64
J31
Q50
Z13
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
478454759.pdf398.18 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63093

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.