EconStor >
University of Oslo >
Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63090
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMundaca, B. Gabrielaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T13:14:35Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T13:14:35Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/63090-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes central bank policies on monitoring banks in distress when liquidity provisions are conditional on performance and a bad shock occurs. A sequential game model is used to analyze two policies: one in which the central bank acts with discretion and the second in which the optimal monitoring policy rule is made public. The results show that banks exert less effort and take higher risks with discretionary monitoring policy. With public information about monitoring rules, there is more central bank monitoring and less need to provide emergency financing. Public information about monitoring resolves the multiple equilibria that arise with discretion and a unique equilibrium emerges where the probability of banking crisis is reduced.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo Osloen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMemorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2007,04en_US
dc.subject.jelE58en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.jelG28en_US
dc.subject.jelG38en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMonitoringen_US
dc.subject.keywordbailoutsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbanking crisesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommitmentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordconditionalityen_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwZentralbanken_US
dc.subject.stwBankenkriseen_US
dc.subject.stwBankrisikoen_US
dc.subject.stwBankenaufsichten_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleMonitoring, liquidity provision and financial crisis risken_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn527056308en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
527056308.pdf351.47 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.