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Title:Monetary regime and the co-ordination of wage setting PDF Logo
Authors:Holden, Steinar
Issue Date:2000
Series/Report no.:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2000,01
Abstract:International comparisons show that countries with co-ordinated wage setting generally have lower unemployment than countries with less co-ordinated wage setting. This paper argues that the monetary regime may affect whether co-ordination among many wage setters is feasible. A strict monetary regime, like a country-specific inflation target, to some extent disciplines wage setters, so that the consequences of uncoordinated wage setting are less detrimental than under a more passive monetary regime (eg a monetary union). Thus, the gains from co-ordination are larger under a passive regime. Under some circumstances a passive regime may induce co-operation in wage setting, and thus lower unemployment, when a stricter regime would not.
Subjects:Wage setting
co-ordination
equilibrium unemployment
monetary regime
monetary union
JEL:E24
J5
E52
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo

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