Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/63015 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum No. 2001,17
Publisher: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Abstract: 
In most models of transboundary pollution, lack of international cooperation does not cause any inefficiency within each country. The paper shows that this result is only valid in the hypothetical case of no international trade. With international trade, we get a domestic inefficiency in addition to the well-known inefficiencies at the international level. More precisely, when there is no cooperation on how to handle transboundary pollution, it is individually rational for each country to choose a policy that gives it a lower welfare than what is possible given the emission levels of all countries.
Subjects: 
environmental policy
transboundary pollution
carbon leakage
JEL: 
F42
Q20
Q28
Q48
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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