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dc.contributor.authorOgnedal, Toneen_US
dc.description.abstractWhen uncertain evidence may lead to legal errors, a reduced standard of proof affects the incentive to violate the law. With noisy evidence, an agent may be convicted even if he obeys the law (type I error) or acquitted even if he violates the law (type II error). If the standard of proof is reduced, the expected penalty for minor crimes increases relative to more serious crimes and relative to law compliance. Agents who initially commited minor law violations will become more law compliant, but agents who initially committed violations above a certain level will choose even more serious violations. Thus, the net effect on law violation is ambiguous. The increased probability of type I errors induces excessive law compliance among those who initially complied with the law. The focus is on white collar crime, defined as illegal conduct of an otherwise legal activity.en_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo Osloen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMemorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 1999,06en_US
dc.titleShould the standard of evidence be reduced for white collar crime?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo

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