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Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63002
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| Title: | | Deductibles in health insurance: Pay or pain?  |
| Authors: | | Asheim, Geir B. Wenche Emblem, Anne Nilssen, Tore |
| Issue Date: | | 2002 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2002,13 |
| Abstract: | | We study a health-insurance market where individuals are o.ered coverage against both medical expenditures and losses in income. Individuals vary in their level of innate ability. If there is private information about the probability of illness and an individual’s innate ability is su.ciently low, we find that competitive insurance contracts yield screening partly in the form of co-payment, i.e., a deductible in pay, and partly in the form of reduced medical treatment, i.e., a deductible in pain. |
| Subjects: | | health insurance adverse selection deductibles |
| JEL: | | D82 I11
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| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo
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