|
EconStor >
University of Oslo >
Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62997
|
| | |
Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Hagem, Cathrine | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Westskog, Hege | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-09-20T13:12:41Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-09-20T13:12:41Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62997 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In this paper we analyze how restricting intertemporal trading by prohibiting borrowing of emission permits affects the ability of a dominant agent to exploit its market power, and the consequences this has for the cost-effectiveness of implementing an emissions target. We show that the monopolist could take advantage of the constraint on borrowing by distributing the sale of permits ineffectively across periods, and moreover that this inefficiency is influenced by the way permits are initially allocated between agents. A cost-effective distribution of abatement across periods can be achieved by an appropriate distribution of the total endowments of permits over time for each agent. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Dep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo Oslo | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2005,04 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D92 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H74 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q52 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | pollution permits | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | intertemporal trading | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | market power | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | borrowing constraint | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Emissionsrechte | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Marktmacht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Intertemporale Allokation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Emissionshandel | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Dominant agent and intertemporal emissions trading | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 481090479 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|