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dc.contributor.authorHagem, Cathrineen_US
dc.contributor.authorWestskog, Hegeen_US
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze how restricting intertemporal trading by prohibiting borrowing of emission permits affects the ability of a dominant agent to exploit its market power, and the consequences this has for the cost-effectiveness of implementing an emissions target. We show that the monopolist could take advantage of the constraint on borrowing by distributing the sale of permits ineffectively across periods, and moreover that this inefficiency is influenced by the way permits are initially allocated between agents. A cost-effective distribution of abatement across periods can be achieved by an appropriate distribution of the total endowments of permits over time for each agent.en_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo Osloen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMemorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2005,04en_US
dc.subject.keywordpollution permitsen_US
dc.subject.keywordintertemporal tradingen_US
dc.subject.keywordmarket poweren_US
dc.subject.keywordborrowing constrainten_US
dc.subject.stwIntertemporale Allokationen_US
dc.titleDominant agent and intertemporal emissions tradingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo

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