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Title:Proper consistency PDF Logo
Authors:Asheim, Geir B.
Issue Date:1999
Series/Report no.:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 1999,31
Abstract:Proper consistency is defined by the properties that each player takes all opponent strategies into account (is cautious) and deems one opponent strategy to be infinitely more likely than another if the opponent prefers the one to the other (respects preferences). When there is common certain belief of proper consistency, a most preferred strategy is properly rationalizable. Any strategy used with positive probability in a proper equilibrium is properly rationalizable. Only strategies that lead to the backward induction outcome is properly rationalizable in the strategic form of a generic perfect information game. Proper rationalizability can be used to test the robustness of inductive procedures.
JEL:C72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo

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