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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 2002,11
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
Divided societies in the developing world experience wasteful struggles for power. We study the relationship between political stability and resources wasted in the struggle within a model of competitive power contests. The model of power contests is similar in structure to models describing oligopolistic market competition. This analogy helps us in deriving results that are new to the conflict literature. We show, for example, that the Herfindahl-Hirschman index can be interpreted as a measure of power concentration and that a peace treaty between Þghting groups have a parallel in tacit collusion between firms in a market.
Schlagwörter: 
Violent conflicts
Rent-seeking games
Herfindahl-Hirschman index
Oligopolistic competition
JEL: 
C70
D23
D74
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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