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Queen Mary, University of London >
School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London >
Working Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62882
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Goyal, Sanjeev | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Vega-Redondo, Fernando | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-09-20T13:01:00Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-09-20T13:01:00Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2003 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62882 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior in games of coordination. An important ingredient of our approach is the way we model partner choice: we suppose that a player can establish ties with other players by unilaterally investing in costly pair-wise links. In this context, individual efforts to balance the costs and benefits of links are shown to lead to a unique equilibrium interaction architecture. The dynamics of network formation, however, has powerful effects on individual behavior: if costs of forming links are below a certain threshold then players coordinate on the risk-dominant action, while if costs are above this threshold then they coordinate on the efficient action. These findings are robust to a variety of modifications in the link formation process. For example, it may be posited that, in order for a link to materialize, the link proposal must be two-sided (i.e. put forward by both agents); or that, in case of a unilateral proposal, the link may be refused by the other party (if, say, the latter's net payoff is negative); or that a pair of agents can play the game even if connected only through indirect links. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Queen Mary, Univ. of London, Dep. of Economics London | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Working Paper, Department of Economics, Queen Mary, University of London 481 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C7 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D6 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Networks, Links, Coordination games, Equilibrium selection, Risk dominance, Efficiency | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kooperatives Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Netzwerk | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Koordination | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gleichgewicht | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Network formation and social coordination | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 377035793 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London
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