Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62855
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dc.contributor.authorAllouch, Nizaren_US
dc.contributor.authorWooders, Myrna Holtzen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T13:00:28Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T13:00:28Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62855-
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a model of an economy with clubs where individuals may belong to multiple clubs and where there may be ever increasing returns to club size. Clubs may be large, as large as the total agent set. The main condition required is that sufficient wealth can compensate for memberships in larger and larger clubs. Notions of price taking equilibrium and the core, both with communication costs, are introduced. These notions require that there is a small cost, called a communication cost, of deviating from a given outcome. With some additional standard sorts of assumptions on preferences, we demonstrate that, given communication costs parameterized by ε > 0, for all sufficiently large economies, the core is non-empty and contains states of the economy that are in the core of the replicated economy for all replications (Edgeworth states of the economy). Moreover, for any given economy, every state of the economy that is in the core for all replications of that economy can be supported as a price-taking equilibrium with communication costs. Together these two results imply that, given the communication costs, for all sufficiently large economies there exists Edgeworth states of the economy and every Edgeworth state can be supported as a price-taking equilibrium.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aQueen Mary, Univ. of London, Dep. of Economics |cLondonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper, Department of Economics, Queen Mary, University of London |x513en_US
dc.subject.jelC62en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCompetitive pricing, Clubs, Local public goods, Hedonic coalitions, Edgeworth, Tiebout hypothesis, Coreen_US
dc.subject.stwPreiswettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwKlubtheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwLokales Öffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwInstitutioneller Wettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwCoreen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePrice taking equilibrium in club economies with multiple memberships and unbounded club sizesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn386084394en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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