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dc.contributor.authorBosch-Domènech, Antonien_US
dc.contributor.authorVriend, Nicolaas J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T12:59:15Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T12:59:15Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62817-
dc.description.abstractConsidering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalent equilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibrium and is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players' choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act as an equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closely related small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well as experimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordination devices.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherQueen Mary, Univ. of London, Dep. of Economics Londonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper, Department of Economics, Queen Mary, University of London 621en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCoordination gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordFocal pointen_US
dc.subject.keywordNash equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordEquilibrium selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordCoordination deviceen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwKoordinationen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devicesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn558918360en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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