|
EconStor >
Queen Mary, University of London >
School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London >
Working Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62817
|
| | |
| Title: | | On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices  |
| Authors: | | Bosch-Domènech, Antoni Vriend, Nicolaas J. |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working Paper, Department of Economics, Queen Mary, University of London 621 |
| Abstract: | | Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalent equilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibrium and is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players' choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act as an equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closely related small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well as experimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordination devices. |
| Subjects: | | Coordination game Focal point Nash equilibrium Equilibrium selection Coordination device |
| JEL: | | C72 C91 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62817
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|