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Title:Anonymous price taking equilibrium in tiebout economies with unbounded club size PDF Logo
Authors:Allouch, Nizar
Conley, John Patrick
Wooders, Myrna Holtz
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:Working Paper, Department of Economics, Queen Mary, University of London 556
Abstract:We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions with finite, but unbounded populations. Under boundedness of per capita payoffs we demonstrate nonemptiness of the core of the economy. We then demonstrate that the equal treatment core coincides with the set of price-taking equilibrium outcomes with anonymous prices - that is, prices for public goods depend only on observable characteristics of agents. Existence of equilibrium follows from nonemptiness of the core and equivalence of the core to the set of equilibrium outcomes. Our approach provides a new technique for showing existence of equilibrium in economies with a continuum of agents.
Subjects:Tiebout, Clubs, Jurisdictions, F-core, Core-equilibrium equivalence, Edgeworth equivalence, Continuum economies with clubs, Crowding types, Core, Equal treatment core
JEL:C62
D71
H41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London

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