Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62787 
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 487
Publisher: 
Queen Mary University of London, Department of Economics, London
Abstract: 
Schelling [1969, 1971a, 1971b, 1978] presented a microeconomic model showing how an integrated city could unravel to a rather segregated city, notwithstanding relatively mild assumptions concerning the individual agents' preferences, i.e., no agent preferring the resulting segregation. We examine the robustness of Schelling's model, focusing in particular on its driving force: the individual preferences. We show that even if all individual agents have a strict preference for perfect integration, best-response dynamics will lead to segregation. What is more, we argue that the one-dimensional and two-dimensional versions of Schelling's spatial proximity model are in fact two qualitatively very different models of segregation.
Subjects: 
Neighborhood segregation, Myopic Nash Equilibria, Best-response dynamics, Markov chain, Limit-behavior
JEL: 
C72
C73
D62
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
591.44 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.