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dc.contributor.authorGrimm, Veronikaen_US
dc.contributor.authorRiedel, Franken_US
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmaren_US
dc.description.abstractThe second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions. In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game.en_US
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2001,31en_US
dc.subject.keywordmulti-unit auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordspectrum auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordindustrial organizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordgame theoryen_US
dc.titleLow price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germanyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin

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