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Sonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62770
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| Title: | | Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany  |
| Authors: | | Grimm, Veronika Riedel, Frank Wolfstetter, Elmar |
| Issue Date: | | 2001 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2001,31 |
| Abstract: | | The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions. In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game. |
| Subjects: | | multi-unit auctions spectrum auctions telecommunications industrial organization game theory |
| JEL: | | D44 D45 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10049639 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin
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