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Title:Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany PDF Logo
Authors:Grimm, Veronika
Riedel, Frank
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Issue Date:2001
Series/Report no.:Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2001,31
Abstract:The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions. In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game.
Subjects:multi-unit auctions
spectrum auctions
telecommunications
industrial organization
game theory
JEL:D44
D45
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10049639
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin

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