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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62769
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Hansen, Jan | en |
dc.contributor.author | Schmidt, Carsten | en |
dc.contributor.author | Strobel, Martin | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-18T13:49:57Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-18T13:49:57Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2001 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10050172 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62769 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Political stock markets (PSM) are sometimes seen as substitutes for opinion polls. On the bases of a behavioral model, specific preconditions were drawn out under which manipulation in PSM can weaken this argument. Evidence for manipulation is reported from the data of two separate PSM during the Berlin 99 state elections. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aHumboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSFB 373 Discussion Paper |x2001,61 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C93 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D4 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G1 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | prognosis | en |
dc.subject.keyword | political stock markets | en |
dc.subject.keyword | decisive vote illusion | en |
dc.subject.keyword | manipulation | en |
dc.title | Manipulation in political stock markets: Preconditions and evidence | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 725565705 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200161 | en |
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