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dc.contributor.authorDesdoigts, Alainen_US
dc.contributor.authorMoizeau, Fabienen_US
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we abandon the stylized median voter and study (i) how distributional tensions can act in many different ways depending on social affinity and on the prospect of upward or downwardmobility of the different income classes, (ii) income distribution dynamics, intergenerational community formation and growth. In a world in which redistributive policies, whether fiscal or educational, affect how the entire economy breaks up into different communities, we find multiple politico-economic regimes that are supported by new international empirical evidence. In particular, we highlight a political economy decision mechanism through which the pressure for redistribution can be highly non linear therefore providing an explanation as to whymore inequality can be associated with less, rather than more, redistributive taxation. Our framework displays multiple steady states which depend on historical economic discrimination. We also provide sufficient conditions on the initial pattern of income distribution and local versus social spillovers ratio under which inequality and segregation persist in the long run.en_US
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2001,65en_US
dc.subject.keywordCommunity formationen_US
dc.subject.keywordhuman capitalen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial mobilityen_US
dc.titleMultiple politico-economic regimes, inequality and growthen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin

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