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Title:Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study PDF Logo
Authors:Güth, Werner
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Issue Date:2001
Series/Report no.:Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2001,15
Abstract:We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders' preference for first- vs. second-price auctions.
Subjects:Experiments
Sealed Bid Auctions
Asymmetric Bidders
Private-Independent Values
JEL:D44
C91
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10048752
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin

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