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Sonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62694
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| Title: | | Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study  |
| Authors: | | Güth, Werner Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta Wolfstetter, Elmar |
| Issue Date: | | 2001 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2001,15 |
| Abstract: | | We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders' preference for first- vs. second-price auctions. |
| Subjects: | | Experiments Sealed Bid Auctions Asymmetric Bidders Private-Independent Values |
| JEL: | | D44 C91 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10048752 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin
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