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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62670
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| Title: | | Arrow's impossibility theorem: Two simple single-profile versions  |
| Authors: | | Feldman, Allan M. Serrano, Roberto |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2008-8 |
| Abstract: | | In this paper we provide two simple new versions of Arrow's impossibility theorem, in a model with only one preference profile. Both versions are transparent, requiring minimal mathematical sophistication. The first version assumes there are only two people in society, whose preferences are being aggregated; the second version assumes two or more people. Both theorems rely on assumptions about diversity of preferences, and we explore alternative notions of diversity at some length. Our first theorem also uses a neutrality assumption, commonly used in the literature; our second theorem uses a neutrality/monotonicity assumption, which is stronger and less commonly used. We provide examples to illustrate our points. |
| Subjects: | | Arrow's theorem single-profile |
| JEL: | | D60 D70 D71 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Brown University
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