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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62660
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Fainmessery, Itay P. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Goldberg, David A. | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-09-17T11:32:02Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-09-17T11:32:02Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62660 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We present a model of repeated games in large buyer-seller networks in the presence of reputation networks via which buyers share information about past transactions. The model allows us to characterize cooperation networks - networks in which each seller cooperates (by providing high quality goods) with every buyer that is connected to her. To this end, we provide conditions under which: [1] the incentives of a seller s to cooperate depend only on her beliefs with respect to her local neighborhood - a subnetwork that includes seller s and is of a size that is independent of the size of the entire network; and [2] the incentives of a seller s to cooperate can be calculated as if the network was a random tree with seller s at its root. Our characterization sheds light on the welfare costs of relying only on repeated interactions for sustaining cooperation, and on how to mitigate such costs. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Brown Univ., Dep. of Economics Providence, RI | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2011-2 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | networks | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | moral hazard | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | graph theory | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | repeated games | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Bilateral and community enforcement in a networked market with simple strategies | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 655166106 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Brown University
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