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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62651
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| Title: | | Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes: An experiment  |
| Authors: | | Putterman, Louis Tyran, Jean-Robert Kamei, Kenju |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2010-1 |
| Abstract: | | The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. But despite uniform money payoffs implying common interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes, and of gender and intelligence. |
| Subjects: | | public good voluntary contribution formal sanction experiment penalty voting |
| JEL: | | C91 C92 D71 D72 H41 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Brown University
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