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dc.contributor.authorPage, Talboten_US
dc.contributor.authorPutterman, Louisen_US
dc.contributor.authorGarcia, Brunoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-17T11:31:47Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-17T11:31:47Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62650-
dc.description.abstractWe introduce new treatments of a voluntary contribution mechanism with opportunities to punish, to see how contributions and punishments change when (a) each dollar lost in punishment must be awarded to another team member and/or when (b) obtaining information on individuals' contributions is a costly choice. Conjectures that tying punishments to rewards might reduce punishment of high contributors (perverse punishment) or increase overall punishing are not completely born out, but innovation (a) nonetheless succeeds in making the net punishment of high contributors much less common because they receive enough rewards to offset punishment. A surprise finding is that innovation (b) also decreases the incidence of misdirected punishment, since high contributors do more monitoring than low ones while low contributors do most of the perverse punishing. Both innovations raise both contributions and earnings relative to the familiar VCM-with-punishment treatment.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherBrown Univ., Dep. of Economics Providence, RIen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2008-1en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelD30en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcollective actionen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperiment, punishmenten_US
dc.titleGetting punishment right: Do costly monitoring or redistributive punishment help?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn571838340en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Brown University

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