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Title:Cores of combined games PDF Logo
Authors:Bloch, Francis
De Clippel, Geoffroy
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2009-1
Abstract:This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. On the other hand, for non-balanced games, the binary relation associating two component games whose combination has an empty core is not transitive. However, we identify a class of non-balanced games which, combined with any other non-balanced game, has an empty core.
Subjects:Cooperative Games
Core
Additivity
Issue Linkage
Multi Issue Bargaining
JEL:C70
C71
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Brown University

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