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Title:No profitable decomposition in quasi-linear allocation problems PDF Logo
Authors:De Clippel, Geoffroy
Bejan, Camelia
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2009-6
Abstract:We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic point of view, in situations where compensations can be made through monetary transfers. The key property we impose on the allocation rule requires that no agent should be able to gain by decomposing the problem into sequences of subproblems. Combined with additional standard properties, it leads to a characterization of the rule that shares the total surplus equally. Hence a traditional welfarist rule emerges as the unique consequence of our axioms phrased in a natural economic environment.
Subjects:Social Choice
Axiomatic Bargaining
Welfarism
Egalitarianism
JEL:C78
D63
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Brown University

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