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| Title: | | A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies  |
| Authors: | | Kunimoto, Takashi Serrano, Roberto |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2010-2 |
| Abstract: | | Implementation in iteratively undominated strategies relies on permissive conditions. However, for the sufficiency results available, authors have relied on assumptions that amount to quasilinear preferences on a numeraire. We uncover a new necessary condition that implies that such assumptions cannot be dispensed with. We term the condition 'restricted deceptionproofness.' It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation are more restrictive than previously thought. |
| Subjects: | | mechanism design exact and approximate implementation iteratively undominated strategies restricted deception-proofness incentive compatibility measurability |
| JEL: | | C72 D78 D82 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Brown University
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