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Title:Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching: The case of private values PDF Logo
Authors:Saran, Rene
Serrano, Roberto
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2010-11
Abstract:In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are randomly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run predictions are minimal sets that are closed under 'the same or better reply' operations. Under additional assumptions in each case, the prediction boils down to pure Nash equilibria, pure ex-post equilibria or pure minimax regret equilibria. These three paradigms exhibit nice robustness properties in the sense that they are independent of beliefs about the exogenous uncertainty of type spaces. The results are illustrated in second-price auctions, first-price auctions and Bertrand duopolies.
Subjects:Fixed and Random Matching
Incomplete Information
Ex-Post Regret Learning
Nash Equilibrium
Ex-Post Equilibrium
Minimax Regret Equilibrium
Second-Price Auction
First-Price Auction
Bertrand Duopoly
JEL:C72
C73
D43
D44
D82
D83
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Brown University

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