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Title:Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma PDF Logo
Authors:Eliaz, Kfir
Serrano, Roberto
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2010-16
Abstract:Consider the problem of information disclosure for a planner who faces two agents interacting in a state-dependent multi-action prisoners' dilemma. We find conditions under which the planner can make use of his superior information by disclosing some of it to the agents, and conditions under which such information leakage is not possible. Although the problem is entirely symmetric, the planner's only way to reveal part of the information is based on creating asymmetries between the two agents by giving them different pieces of information. We also find conditions under which such partially informative equilibria are the planner's best equilibria.
Subjects:Information Disclosure
Generalized Prisoners' Dilemma
Uninformative Equilibria
Partially or Fully Informative Equilibria
JEL:C72
D82
D83
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Brown University

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