Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62612
Authors: 
de Clippel, Geoffroy
Pérez-Castrillo, David
Wettstein, David
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2010-5
Abstract: 
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.
Subjects: 
Pareto Efficiency
Egalitarian Equivalence
Asymmetric Information
JEL: 
D62
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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