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| Title: | | Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information  |
| Authors: | | de Clippel, Geoffroy Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein, David |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2010-5 |
| Abstract: | | We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible. |
| Subjects: | | Pareto Efficiency Egalitarian Equivalence Asymmetric Information |
| JEL: | | D62 C71 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Brown University
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