Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62612
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorde Clippel, Geoffroyen_US
dc.contributor.authorPérez-Castrillo, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorWettstein, Daviden_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-17T11:30:50Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-17T11:30:50Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62612-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aBrown University, Department of Economics |cProvidence, RIen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics |x2010-5en_US
dc.subject.jelD62en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPareto Efficiencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordEgalitarian Equivalenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric Informationen_US
dc.titleEgalitarian equivalence under asymmetric informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn638265169en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

Files in This Item:
File
Size
210.33 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.